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The process of development is full of uncertainties, 
especially if it is a process of transition from a planned 
economy to a market oriented one. Because of 
uncertainties and country specificity, development 
must be a process of learning, selective adaptation, and 
industrial upgrading. This paper attempts to distill 
lessons from China’s reform and opening up process, 
and investigate the underlying reasons behind China’s 
success in trade expansion and economic growth. From 
its beginnings with home-grown and second-best 
institutions, China has embarked on a long journey of 
reform, experimentation, and learning by doing. It is 
moving from a comparative advantage-defying strategy 
This paper—a product of the Development Economics Vice Presidency and Finance & Private Sector Development 
Division, World Bank Institute—is part of a larger effort in the department to synthesize and distill lessons from China's 
30-years reform experience which may be relevant to other developing countries, for the purposes of South-South Experience 
Sharing. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at ywang2@worldbank.org.  
to a comparative advantage-following strategy. The 
country is catching up quickly through augmenting its 
factor endowments and upgrading industries; but this has 
been only partially successful. Although China is facing 
several difficult challenges—including rising inequality, 
an industrial structure that is overly capital and energy 
intensive, and related environmental degradation—it 
is better positioned to tackle them now than it was 30 
years ago. This paper reviews the drivers behind China’s 
learning and trade integration and provides both positive 
and negative lessons for developing countries with diverse 
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The way to make the transition from a traditional planned economy to a 
market economy is just like crossing the river by groping the stones 
beneath the surface.  
 






China has achieved unprecedented economic growth and the most rapid poverty reduction in 
human history in the past 30 years. Real gross domestic product (GDP) has expanded at an 
annual average pace of more than 10 percent. F
1
F China has grown to be the fourth largest economy 
and second largest trading nation in the world. A 2008 study by Chen and Ravallion found that 
using the World Bank’s $1.25 per day consumption measure, the proportion of the population 
living in poverty fell from 84 percent in 1981 to 15.6 percent in 2005, and more than 600 million 
people were lifted out of poverty (Chen and Ravallion 2008).F
2 
 
China is unique in many ways. It is the largest developing country in terms of population, and it 
was a closed economy 30 years ago. After the country embarked on its transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy, it had to combine the three daunting tasks of 
structural transformation, economic liberalization, and institutional transition into one – i.e., 
“three into one.”  And China did it remarkably well.  
 
China’s incremental and experimental strategies for economic reform and pragmatic and gradual 
liberalization have been unique and unorthodox. This approach has been piecemeal, partial, 
incremental, and often experimental.  It has not been guided by a well-founded theory or 
followed a pre-determined blueprint. In the late 1980s, many observers predicted that the 
reforms in China would lead nowhere.  The success of China’s approach to transition so far has 
produced many challenges to conventional wisdom in economic theory (Chow 1997; Perkins 
2002).  This approach violates almost all the basic propositions for a successful transition that 
were identified by many economists advising the former socialist countries in the early phase of 
their transition. The success has also puzzled many economists (Nolan 1995).  Some economists 
suggest that China's success poses a challenge to the wisdom of the Washington Consensus 
which considers stabilization, market liberalization, and privatization as necessary components 
to a successful transition. The Chinese experience demonstrates the superiority of evolutionary, 
experimental, and bottom-up reforms over the comprehensive and top-down, big bang approach.  
Key questions /debates include:   
 
                                                 
1 The World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009, December 2008. 
2 This paper uses the new PPP data (2008) and finds that though China is poorer than previously thought, it is no 
less successful in poverty reduction. The different of PPP conversion factor does not change the conclusion that 
China has had the largest and fastest poverty reduction in history (World Bank 2008).   4
•  Why have unorthodox reform approaches and openness helped China to achieve the most 
rapid economic growth and poverty reduction in human history? Have these strategies, 
including home-grown and “second-best institutions” like Special Economic Zones 
(SEZs), affected the patterns of trade? 
•  Has China followed a comparative advantage defying (CAD) or comparative advantage 
following (CAF) strategy (as defined in Lin, 2007) in the transition process?  
•  Which positive and negative experiences and lessons from China are relevant for other 
developing countries?  
 
This study aims to review and synthesize China's reform and trade integration with the world 
economy, with a focus on China’s unique approach to reform (gaige) and opening up (kaifang) 
since 1978.  We argue that China’s reforms follow the logic of a comparative advantage-
following strategy (Lin 2003, 2007), and the logic of “development as a process of learning 
and innovation” (Wang 2007). 
The framework of the paper is based on the following premises:  
•  An economy’s factor endowments, which are given at any point in time and can be 
changed over time, are an important starting point for an enquiry about economic 
development in a country.  The factor endowments in an economy determine its total 
budget and relative factor prices – the two most important economic parameters at any 
given time.  The structure of its factor endowments determines endogenously its optimal 
industrial structure.  
•  Development is a process that is full of uncertainties, and even more so is the process of 
economic transition. Because of this uncertainty and different country specificity, 
development must be a process of learning, selective adaptation, and innovation. When 
China started the reform, it faced tremendous uncertainty, so it is only natural that the 
Chinese leaders adopted a pragmatic reform strategy that allowed for nation-wide 
incubation, trial and error, selection of what worked, and removal of what did not.  
•  In the transformation from a comparative advantage-defying (CAD) strategy to a 
comparative advantage-following (CAF) strategy, the optimal industrial structure will 
upgrade according to the changes in its endowment structure. The upgrading of industrial 
structure requires learning in areas where it is needed the most (with greater returns).  
Different from knowledge, which is a stock concept, learning is a series of actions to 
acquire knowledge, build capacity, and adapt to new technologies, industries, and 
institutions. Just as growth is a flow concept, learning is a flow concept: it involves the 
accumulation of knowledge in a dynamic process that empowers actors, learners, 
businesses, local governments, and other entities to take action. Learning itself is a 
process of upgrading a country’s human capital – key to successful industrial upgrading. 
Learning effort is a function of the expected rate of return in a subsector, market 
conditions, and the macro environment.   
 
This paper is written for both Chinese readers who are summarizing the 30 years of economic 
reforms; and an international audience that is interested in understanding “the why” and “the   5
how” behind China’s economic success.  Our special interest is in Africa. Based on our recent 
visit there, many countries are trying to set up export processing zones and develop industrial 
clusters, in part through South-South learning from China.  Thus, this paper is relevant in terms 
of how to evaluate objectively China’s experience with trade and investment integration, which 
may be relevant for the particular circumstances in other countries.  
 
The paper is organized as followings. Section II provides a historical review of China’s 
development strategy before the economic reforms. Section III reviews China’s dual track 
reform approach and opening up process, which followed the logic of learning to shift away 
from a CAD strategy to a CAF strategy. Section IV evaluates the causes behind the rapid trade 
integration and economic growth. Section V analyzes some positive and negative lessons for 




II.  Why Was China Closed? The High Cost of Industrialization Using CAD Strategy 
 
In 1978 when reform started, China was a low-income country with agriculture as its largest 
sector in terms of employment. This structure is similar to that in many countries in Africa.  The 
Chinese economy at that time was closed, oriented toward heavy industry, had few labor-
intensive manufacturing exports, and had to export raw materials such as crude coal, crude oil, 
minerals, and agricultural products to earn foreign exchange.  
 
China at that time was like other low-income countries in that its endowment structure was one 
of relative abundance in natural resources and/or unskilled labor, with a scarcity of human and 
physical capital. In these countries, only the labor-intensive and resource-intensive industries 
had comparative advantage in open, competitive markets (Ohlin 1967, Heckscher-Ohlin 1991; 
Lin 2003, Lin and Zhang 2007).  Before the reform in 1979, the Chinese government adopted a 
comparative advantage-defying (CAD) and heavy industry-oriented development strategy. This 
strategy meant that the economic system in China was distorted and closed. 
 
At the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the Chinese government inherited a war-torn, 
agrarian economy in which 89.4 percent of the population resided in rural areas and the 
industrial sector accounted for only 12.6 percent of the national income. At that time, the heavy-
industry sector was the symbol of the nation's power and economic achievement. Lack of 
industrialization had forced China, India, and other developing countries to yield to the colonial 
powers. It was natural that the Chinese government and people, like many governments and 
people in poor countries, would aspire to achieve industrialization. Therefore, the government 
set the development of heavy industries as high priority.  
 
Heavy industry is capital-intensive. China was a capital-scarce, low-income, agrarian economy 
in the 1950s. Therefore, capital-intensive heavy industry was not China’s comparative advantage 
at that time. The construction of a heavy-industry project in a developing country requires a long 
gestation period, bulky investments, and imported equipment. When the Chinese government 
initiated this strategy in the early 1950s, the economy had limited capital, a high interest rate,   6
and scarce foreign exchange. Its exportable goods were limited and primarily consisted of low-
price agricultural products. Because the three characteristics of the Chinese economy were 
mismatched with the three characteristics of a heavy industry project, spontaneous development 
of capital-intensive industry was impossible.  
 
Policies, institutions, and openness were endogenous. Due to this mismatch, a set of distorted 
macro policies was required for the development of heavy industry. At the beginning of the first 
Five-Year Plan, the government instituted a policy of low interest rates and over-valued 
exchange rates to reduce the costs of both interest payments and imported equipment. 
Meanwhile, in order to secure enough funds for industrial expansion, a policy of low input prices 
– including nominal wage rates for workers and prices for raw materials, energy, and 
transportation – evolved alongside the adoption of the development strategy. The assumption 
was that low prices would enable enterprises to create profits large enough to repay the loans or 
to accumulate enough funds for reinvestment. Therefore, private enterprises were soon 
nationalized and new key enterprises were owned by the State so that it could secure control 
over profits for reinvesting in heavy-industry projects. Trade protection was also endogenous.   
In order to protect domestic industry, high import tariffs and nontariff barriers were put in place 
to shield the otherwise nonviable industries from international competition.F
3
F Exporting was 
considered the only way to earn the foreign exchange needed to import advanced technology.  In 
addition to providing cheap food for industrialization, agriculture was the main foreign-exchange 
earner. In the 1950s, agricultural products alone made up more than 40 percent of all exports. If 
processed agricultural products are also counted, agriculture contributed more than 60 percent of 
China's foreign exchange earnings up to the 1970s. Because foreign exchange was as important 
as capital for the CAD strategy, the country's capacity to import capital goods for 
industrialization in the early stages of development clearly depended on its natural resources and 
agricultural performance.  
 
Low interest rates, high tariffs, and over-valued exchange rates; low nominal wage rates; and 
low prices for raw materials and living necessities constituted the basic macro policy 
environment of the CAD strategy. 
 
The above macro policies induced a total imbalance in the supply and demand for credit, foreign 
exchange, raw materials, and other necessities. The government set plans and administrative 
controls to allocate scarce credit, foreign reserves, raw materials, and basic commodities, 
ensuring that the limited resources would be used for the targeted projects. Moreover, the State 
monopolized banks, foreign trade, and material distribution systems, and was able to mobilize 
and invest massive resources in heavy industries. More than three-quarters of the population 
earned a living in agriculture and labor-intensive light industries, which were consistent with the 
country’s comparative advantage. However, agriculture and light industries each received less 
than 10 percent of State investment in the period 1953-1985, while 45 percent went to heavy 
                                                 
3 The thought that the government in a lagging economy needs to support the manufacturing industry in order to 
catch up can be traced to the writings of List (1841), the father of the infant industry argument for trade protection. 
List’s thesis and Germany’s industrialization experience impressed social elites and national leaders in India and 
other parts of the developing world, and shaped their thinking about trade policy and the role of government in 
industrialization (Dhar, 2003).   7
industry. As a result, the share of heavy industry in the combined total value of agriculture and 
industry grew from 15 percent in 1952 to about 40 percent in the 1970s. 
 
The high cost of early industrialization.  Judging from China's sector composition, the trinity of 
the traditional socialist economic structure – a distorted macro-policy environment, a planned 
allocation system, and micro-managed institutions – reached its intended goal of accelerating the 
development of heavy industry. However, China paid a high price for such an achievement. The 
economy was very inefficient due to low allocative and technical efficiency. The most important 
indicator that reflected this inefficiency was the extremely low rate of total factor productivity 
growth. A World Bank study shows that, even calculated using the most favorable assumptions, 
the growth rate was merely 0.5 percent between 1952 and 1981, only a quarter of the average 
growth rate of 19 developing countries included in the study (World Bank 1985a). Moreover, the 
total factor productivity of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was in a state of stagnation or 
decline between 1957 and 1982 (World Bank 1985b). 
 
In summary, although the adoption of a CAD strategy can in some cases establish some 
advanced industries in developing countries, it inevitably leads to inefficient resource allocation, 
suppresses worker incentives, provides fertile grounds for rampant rent-seeking and corruption, 
leads to mushrooming nonviable enterprises, and causes deterioration in income distribution and 
poor economic performance.  In the end, there is “more haste, less speed.” The adoption of a 
CAD strategy will not narrow the gap between developing and developed nations; instead, it will 
widen the gap.  
 
 
III. Reforms Follow the Logic of Learning and Innovation 
 
China’s rapid growth and poverty reduction are attributable to its gradual market-oriented 
reforms, openness to trade and investment, and transformation from CAD to CAF strategies, 
which can be ascribed to reforms that followed the logic of learning and innovation to explore its 
comparative advantage.  The reform started with the “easier” reforms, relying on home-grown 
institutions in rural areas – the household responsibility system (HRS) – followed by an 
expansion of township and village enterprises (TVEs), gradual liberalization of trade regimes via 
special economic zones (SEZs), liberalization of prices at the margin, and opening up to the 
global economy.  
 
The more complex reforms started relatively late in the process: fiscal reforms (1994) and 
financial reforms (after 2000). (The process is illustrated in Figure 1.) “Crossing the river by 
groping the stones beneath the surface” became the hallmark of China’s economic reform – 
implementing partial reforms in an experimental manner, often in a few regions, and expanding 
them on proven success. This gradual reform also explains the relatively stable and continuous 
contribution of total factor productivity to growth over the reform period. 
 
 
   8
Source: Wang (2007). 
 
 
First, China's leaders “did not have a blueprint” when they set out to reform the economic 
system, as Perkins (1988, p. 601) observed. Instead of being designed a priori, the choice of 
specific reform measures and the sequence of transition reflected the government’s pragmatism 
toward the problems or crises that emerged in the economic system and the opportunities that 
could be utilized to mitigate or solve the problems.  
 
Second, retrospectively, the transition process in China followed a logical process that is 
predictable from the internal logic of a Soviet-type economy (Lin, Cai, and Li, 2003, Chap. 5). 
  
The Chinese approach in essence is a “micro” first approach (McKinnon 1995), which is 
different from the “macro” first approach to transition.  In China, the transition started with 
improvement of incentives through decollectivization of agriculture, improvement of governance 
of state-owned enterprises by expanding enterprise autonomy, improvement of resource 
allocation by the promotion of non-state enterprises that face hard budget constraints, and 
introduction of a dual-track system for prices and the exchange rate before their liberalization.  
 
Third, the reform process in China followed the logic of learning and experimentation, in which 
all economic agents – including local governments and the private sector – are encouraged to try 
and solve the pressing issues during the transition. “Let a thousand flowers bloom” and try to 
solve the problems in the sectors that need it the most.   
 
Kaufman and Wang 1995 developed a simple model for human capital production in which the 
gain in learning is a function of demand for and supply of sector-specific knowledge, as well as 




   9
indicators reflecting market conditions and the macro-environment.  Intuitively, an economic 
agent, be it an individual or a firm, is motivated to learn in a specific sector if the expected rate 
of return from engaging in that sector is higher than the financial and opportunity costs of 
learning. When prices are liberalized, learning gain is the largest (rate of return highest) in 
sectors where the price differentials are the highest, provided there are clearly defined property 
rights, freedom of entry, labor market flexibility, and a stable macro environment.  That is, 
 
) ; , ( Macro M R f L i i i =  
 
where learning in sector i is a function of the expected net rate of return in sector i, the market 
conditions in sector i,F
4
F and a vector of variables reflecting the macro-environment in the country, 
including property rights, openness, law and order, inflation, national security, etc.  The rate of 
return, R, in sector i would in turn depend on the level of price differentials between domestic 
and imported goods, cost structure, and ultimately, whether the country has comparative 
advantage in this sector. Where there is a large price difference, the incentive for learning would 
be high.  
 
We submit the hypothesis that in China, private sector learning happened most rapidly in sectors 
where prices were liberalized early on, and entry and exit were allowed. And this was in the 
labor intensive sectors. From the following discussion, one can see that this is the main reason 
why China is able to catch up in these sectors and to become more successful in labor-intensive 
exports. 
 
3.1  In Terms of Institutional Transition, What Happened and When? 
 
The institutional reform and opening up processes are intertwined.  This section examines the 
two processes separately and step by step.  In terms of the sequence of China’s transition, the 
country conducted the easier micro-management reforms first, and then moved to the more 
complex macro-policy environment issues at a later stage.    
 
(a) The micro-management system reforms  
 
The most important change in the micro-management system was the replacement of collective 
farming with a household-based system, now known as the household responsibility system 
(HRS). In the beginning, the government had not intended to change the farming institutions. 
Starting in a village in Anhui in late 1978, HRS was scaled up to 45 percent in 1980, and to 98 
percent in 1983. The land lease was limited to only one-to-three years at the beginning, later 
extended to 15 years, and later to 30 years after the expiration of the first contract. Empirical 
estimates show that almost half of the 42.2 percent growth of output in the cropping sector in 
1978-84 was driven by productivity change brought about by the reforms. Furthermore, almost 
all of the above productivity growth was attributable to the changes resulting from the 
                                                 
4 M could be a vector of variables reflecting the degree of freedom for entry and exit, investment climate, market 
size, or proximity to a large market, infrastructure, concentration, and labor market condition in that sector  i.    10
introduction of the household responsibility system (Fan 1991; Huang and Rozelle 1994; Lin 
1992; McMillan, et al. 1989; Wen 1993). 
 
Unlike the spontaneous nature of farming institution reform, the reform in the management 
system of the SOEs was initiated by the government. These reforms have undergone three 
stages: the initial expansion of enterprise autonomy in 1984-86; a formal contractual 
responsibility system (1987-1992); and the “corporatization” process from 1993 to the present, 
in which small SOEs were sold to the private sector (according to the Zhucheng model), and 
large SOEs were restructured and listed in the equity market through IPOs (Uzhuada fangxiaoU). 
Production function estimates in several studies find that for industry the increase in enterprise 
autonomy increased productivity in the SOEs (Chen et al. 1988; Gordon and Li 1989; Dollar 
1990; Jefferson et al. 1992; Groves et al. 1994; Li 1997, and Wang and Yao 2003). Therefore, 
the reforms in the micro-management system in both agriculture and industry have created a 
flow of new resources, an important feature of China's reforms.  
 
An unexpected effect of the relaxation of the resource allocation mechanism was the rapid 
growth of non-State enterprises, especially the TVEs. Rural industry already existed under the 
traditional system as a result of the government's decision to mechanize agriculture and develop 
rural processing industries to finance the mechanization in 1971. In 1978 the entry and exit of 
TVEs were allowed in a large number of sectors, and the output of TVEs consisted of 7.2 
percent of the total value of industrial output in China. In 1981-91, the number of TVEs, 
employment, and total output value grew at average annual rates of 26.6 percent, 11.2 percent, 
and 29.6 percent, respectively. The annual growth rate of TVEs in total output value was three 
times that of the State firms in the same period. In 1993, the output of TVEs accounted for 38.1 
percent of total industrial output in China. The share of industrial output from nonstate 
enterprises increased from 22 percent in 1978 to more than 75 percent in 2003 (see Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2.  Rapid Development of Township and Village Enterprises in 1978-2007: Initial 
















Source: Based the China Statistical Yearbook, 2008.  





































The rapid entry of TVEs and other types of nonstate enterprises exerted pressure on the SOEs 
and triggered the State's policy of delegating more autonomy to the SOEs. And the development 
of TVEs and non-State enterprises significantly rectified the misallocation of resources. In most 
cases, non-State enterprises had to pay market prices for their inputs, and their products were 
sold at market prices. The price signals induced non-State enterprises to adopt more labor-
intensive technologies and concentrate on more labor-intensive small industries, much more so 
than they did on SOEs. Therefore, the production structure of non-State enterprises was more 
consistent with the comparative advantages of China's endowments.  
 
(b) Reforms of the macro-policy environment 
 
In the trinity of the traditional economic system, the distorted macro-policy environment was 
linked most closely to the development strategy, and its effects on allocative and technical 
efficiency were indirect. The reforms of the macro-policies were thus the most sluggish. We will 
argue later that most of the economic problems that appeared during the reforms – for example, 
the cyclical pattern of growth and rampant rent-seeking – can be attributed to the inconsistency 
between the distorted policy environment and the liberalized allocation and semi-private 
enterprise system.  
 
Changes in the macro-policy environment started in the commodity price system.  Material 
supplies were progressively de-linked from the plan, and the number of controlled items was 
incrementally reduced. Centralized credit rationing was also delegated to local banks at the end 
of 1984. The government introduced the dual-track price system that year, which allowed the 
SOEs to sell their output in excess of quotas at market prices and to plan their output 
accordingly. The aim of the dual-track price system was to reduce the marginal price distortion 
in the SOEs' production decisions while leaving the State a measure of control over material 
allocation. As the share of a commodity that was allocated under the planned price was gradually 
reduced due to the growth of non-state sectors and the outside-the-plan production activity of the 
SOEs, the government would then give up the planned price, allowing the price to converge to 
market prices. By 1988 only 30 percent of retail sales were made at planned prices, and the 
SOEs obtained 60 percent of their inputs and sold 60 percent of their outputs at market prices 
(Zou 1992). By 1996, with the exception of a few raw materials and coal, fuel, and 
transportation, the prices of most commodities and services had been liberalized. 
 
The second major change in the macro environment occurred in the foreign exchange rate 
policy. In 1979-80, the official exchange rate was roughly 1.5 yuan per US dollar. The rate could 
not cover the costs of exports, as the average cost of earning one US dollar was around 2.5 yuan. 
A dual rate system was adopted at the beginning of 1981. Commodity trade was settled at the 
internal rate of 2.8 yuan per dollar; the official rate of 1.53 yuan per dollar continued to apply to 
non-commodity transactions. After 1985, the proportion of retained foreign exchange, which 
was introduced in 1979, was gradually raised, and enterprises were allowed to swap their foreign 
exchange entitlement with other enterprises through the Bank of China at rates higher than the 
official exchange rate. Restrictions on trading foreign exchange were further relaxed with the 
establishment of a "foreign exchange adjustment center" in Shenzhen in 1985, in which   12
enterprises could trade foreign exchange at negotiated rates. By the late 1980s, such centers were 
established in most provinces in China and more than 80 percent of the foreign-exchange 
earnings were swapped in these centers (Sung 1994). The climax of foreign exchange rate policy 
reform was the establishment of a managed floating system and unification of the dual rate 
system on January 1, 1994.  By that time, 80 percent of foreign exchange had already been 
allocated through the swap markets. Therefore the significant devaluation at the time of 
unification did not produce a big shock to the economy. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, 
the exchange rate was pegged to the dollar and kept stable. After July 2005, due to the large 
current account surplus, RMB was allowed to appreciate gradually, from 8.7 yuan to the dollar 
in 1994, to 6.8 yuan to the dollar in 2008.  Since August 2008, due to global financial crisis and 
economic slowdown, the RMB appreciation has slowed and essentially stopped.   
 
Interest-rate policy is the least affected area of the traditional macro-policy environment. 
Under the heavy industry-oriented development strategy, the interest rate was kept artificially 
low to facilitate the expansion of capital-intensive industries. After the reforms started in 1979, 
the government was forced to raise both loan rates and savings rates several times. However, the 
rates were maintained at levels far below market-clearing rates throughout the reform process. 
Three development banks were established in 1994 to finance long-term projects, imports and 
exports, and agricultural infrastructure at subsidized rates. The promulgation of the Central Bank 
Law and the Commercial Bank Law in 1995 and 1996 strengthened the authority of People’s 
Bank of China (PBoC) and provided commercial banks with a legal framework for operation. 
However, interest rates have been tightly controlled by the PBoC, until recently. The mentality 
of the heavy industry-oriented development strategy is deeply rooted in the mind of China's 
political leaders. To accelerate the development of capital-intensive industry in a capital-scarce 
economy, a distorted macro-policy environment –  at the very least in the form of a low interest-
rate policy – is essential. The inter-bank lending rate was liberalized first, and then after several 
years in the WTO and foreign bank competition was introduced, the lending rate has been 
gradually made flexible.F
5
F Until 2003, the state sector received a disproportionate share of credit 
but only produced 23 percent of GDP, whereas the private sector produced 52 percent of GDP 
but accounted for 27 percent of outstanding loans (McKinsey Global Institute, May 2006). 
Currently lending rates to small and medium enterprises are more flexible, but the prime lending 
rate and deposit rate are not yet liberalized. This low interest rate policy has played an important 





3.2   Terms of Trade Reforms and Export Upgrading: What Happened and When? 
In contrast to the institutional reforms (UgaigeU), the opening up (UkaifangU) process in China’s trade 
and investment can be divided into four stages: 
                                                 
5 For post-WTO financial sectors reforms, See, for example, Allen, Qian, Qian, and Zhao 2008, Lardy, B Wang 
2006,  Yi 200x, Yao, Han and Feng 2008,  and Zhao and Wang 2008.  
6 On distortion in financial structure and industrial structure, see Lin 2008 on “Rebalancing equity and efficiency for 
equitable and sustainable growth”.    13
•  1979-1987: Reforms aimed to break the State monopoly in trade, to experiment with 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and to provide incentives for exporters. Foreign 
borrowing and direct investment were encouraged, but FDI was small and mainly (85 
percent) from Hong Kong and Taiwan, located in SEZs.  
•  1988-1993: Reforms fostered market development, introduced the responsibility system 
and the shared foreign exchange revenue system to promote export at all levels – the 
center, local, and enterprises – and the dual exchange rate system was implemented at 
this stage, and import tariffs were beginning to be reduced. 
•  1994-2001: Reforms established the market oriented international trade system, unified 
the foreign exchange rate in 1994, reduced tariffs unilaterally from an average of 40 
percent to 16 percent, and actively prepared for WTO accession. 
 
•  2001-present: There has been rapid growth in trade and foreign investment as a result of 
China joining the WTO, locking-in liberalization of trade in goods and in services, 
making China’s laws and institutions conform with international standards, and 
providing a more certain policy and legal environment for investors.  Total trade has 
been expanding at an annual average rate of more than 35 percent, and export structure 




F Total trade 
value exploded from $510 billion in 2001 to $2,174 billion in 2007.  China became the 
third largest trading nation in the world in the same year.  
 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, China’s exports were concentrated in resource-intensive 
raw materials and primary products, such as coal, crude oil, minerals, grains, and food and 
vegetables.  This was consistent with China’s natural endowment at that time (Figure 3 from the 
World Bank 1985), despite of the government’s efforts at building heavy industries. But 
differing from other low-income countries, China did have some manufacturing exports, and 
machinery accounted for 5 percent of total exports (Table A1).   This was a result of many years 
of Soviet-type CAD strategy.  However, China did not have sufficient home-grown knowledge 
and skills that were consistent with its comparative advantage, such as how to make labor-
intensive textiles, clothing, shoes, and toys that were exportable.  Thus, foreign investors, 
including overseas Chinese, brought this practical know-how about the international market and 









                                                 
7 National Bureau of Statistics and Ministry of Commerce of China.   14
Figure 3. Initial Conditions: China Was an Exporter of Primary Products in the 1970s 
Manufacturing exports increased after the initial opening of SEZs 
 























It is noteworthy that China’s two parallel processes of reforms and opening up have been 
intertwined, one after another, and mutually reinforcing. The first line of action established four 
“Special Economic Zones” in the late 1970s, where regulations streamlined for trade promotion 
and preferential treatment were provided to attract foreign direct investment.  The second 
parallel line of action is domestic fiscal decentralization, which began with a fiscal contract 
system in which local governments entered long-term fiscal contracts with higher-level 





F  This system, albeit imperfect and eventually replaced by a tax assignment 
system in 1994, provided large incentives for local governments to develop local economies by 
opening to trade and foreign investment and learning from them, so that local revenue would 
grow. The autonomy assigned to local governments included foreign exchange revenue sharing, 
fiscal revenue retention, approval of investment projects under a certain amount, and expenditure 
decisions, which gave local governments more opportunities to engage in initiatives promoting 
the local accumulation of capital via trade, FDI, and development of TVEs (semi-private).  
 
                                                 
8 This argument has been supported by many empirical studies. See for example, Qian and Weingast 1997, Cao, 
Qian and Weingast 1999, and Qian 2000.     15
From 1979 to 1991, foreign borrowing dominated FDI. After the establishment of four SEZs, 
setting up joint ventures and joint cooperation companies were the main mode of cooperation.F
9
F  
During that period, 85 percent of foreign capital came from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, and 
other Asia countries.  Foreign investors played a vital role in providing the market connections 
on what types of products were needed by the international market, and how to get orders for 
exports, and how to get access to the technology that is suitable for the development stage of the 
country. Thus labor-intensive industries were able to expand rapidly. 
 
•  The first industrial upgrade happened in 1986, when exports of textiles and clothing 
exceeded crude oil. This point in history signified China’s transition from exporting 
resource-intensive products to labor-intensive textile and clothing products, which is 
consistent with China’s comparative advantage. 
 
•  The second upgrade happened in 1995, when China’s export of machineries and 
electronics exceeded textiles and clothing. This indicated that China started the transition 
from exporting traditional labor-intensive exports to non-traditional labor-intensive 
products. 
 
•  The third upgrade happened after China’s accession to the WTO, when high and new 
tech exports grew rapidly, and the level of product sophistication increased. The central 
and local governments conducted regulatory reforms to improve the investment climate, 
and provided incentives for FDI, export expansion, and private sector development.   
Many exporters have become an integral part of the global supply chains of 
multinationals in automobiles, computers, and airplanes (Figure 4). There is, however, a 


















                                                 
9 However, a substantial amount of foreign investment was “round-tripping” investment from domestic sources, 
trying to take advantage of preferential treatment for foreign investors, and avoid polity uncertainty toward the 
private sector.     16
Figure 4.  China Has Been Following Its Comparative Advantage:  From Raw Materials in 
the 1980s, to Labor Intensive Manufacturing Products in the Mid-1990s 
 
Composition Change of China's Gross Export (1984-2006)
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Source: UN Comtrade Database (Sep. 2008)  
 
Source: Based on UN COMTRADE data. 
 
 
From this process of upgrading, one can see clearly the importance of learning: initially learning 
from overseas Chinese and foreign investors, and learning by importing, and later, learning by 
exporting.  This is consistent with the theory of CAF strategies. Why? 
 
Since industrial structures are endogenous to the endowment structure of a country, the goal of a 
government’s development strategy should aim to upgrade the endowment structure.  Upgrading 
the endowment structure requires capital to accumulate faster than the growth of labor and 
natural resources. With the upgrading of the endowment structure, the industrial/technology 
structure of the economy also needs to be upgraded. As the upgrading of industrial/technology is 
an innovation by nature, it requires learning and accumulation of knowledge.  That is, learning 
and knowledge accumulation are an integral process in the upgrading of an economy’s 
endowments, technology, and industry.    
 
 
IV.    Why Was China Able to Achieve Rapid Growth? 
 
Both China and Vietnam have been able to maintain rapid growth during the transition process. 
The above discussion provides us some explanations for the success.  
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First, micro-institutional reforms have provided the incentives in the SOEs and farms to produce 
more efficiently, and the macro-management environment has been gradually opened 
/liberalized, allowing the market price to play a role at the margin.  
 
Second, market reforms have allowed prices to better reflect the scarcities in the economy 
(except in a few cases regarding the interest rate, land, and other resources, and the exchange 
rate), which in turn allows firms to specialize according to comparative advantage and to 
compete in the international market. The power of specialization is endless, and China is a living 
example of it.   
 
The question is, how best to explain the dramatic trade expansion and upgrading of the industrial 
sector?  Has China really followed its comparative advantages? This section will discuss some 
misunderstandings about China’s trade pattern and export sophistication.  
 
4. 1  Measurement Issues of Trade Integration  
 
A commonly used measure for trade integration is the exports-to-GDP ratio.  According to this 
ratio, China is extremely successful: its exports-to-GDP rose from only 9 percent in 1980 to over 
36 percent in 2006.  However, this ratio may be a misleading indicator of an economy’s actual 
dependence on trade in the presence of processing trade.  This is due to the geographical 
segmentation of world production: Intermediate goods may cross country borders many times 
before they become exports of final products.  This is also why world trade growth has been 
much faster than global GDP growth in past three decades (Yi, 2003). The fundamental reason is 
that exports and GDP are measured by different accounting standards. The size of an economy 
is measured by GDP, which is a net or value-added concept, while exports are still measured in 
gross terms containing both domestic and imported content.  
 
Figure 5 shows two interesting points. First, the exports-to-GDP ratio for China and Mexico, at 
36.7 and 29.8 percent, respectively, in 2006, are extraordinarily high for large economies. This 
compares with 7.9 percent for the United States, 12.1 percent for the EU, 14.9 percent for Japan, 
12.9 for Brazil, and 13.2 percent for India in the same year. Second, the exports-to-GDP ratio of 
Mexico and China increased dramatically when major trade liberalization packages were 
implemented: NAFTA in 1994 for Mexico, and China’s WTO accession at the end of 2001.    
 
Figure 5 Exports-to-GDP Ratio 
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Source: Koopman, Robert, Zhi Wang and Shang-jin Wei, 2008a. 
 
 
Related to the fragmentation of global production, there is a rapid expansion of processing trade 
in developing economies, especially China. Based on China’s customs statistics, processing 
exports accounted for more than 55 percent of manufacturing exports to the world during past 
decades. This type of exports is characterized as “importing for export” – firms import parts and 
other intermediate materials from abroad, duty free, and then re-export the processed or 
assembled final products to the international market.  Ignoring such a difference in production 
structure will overestimate the domestic value-added share in gross exports for economies that 
are heavily involved in the global supply chain and processing trade, such as China and Mexico 
(Koopman, Wang, and Wei, 2008).  
 
4.2  Upgrading Factor Endowments 
 
The third reason for China’s success is that it has continuously upgraded its factor 
endowments by learning and capital accumulation.  Capital has accumulated at a faster 
pace than growth of labor and natural resources, which allows the factor endowments to 
be upgraded.  One of the reasons is improved incentives for reforms in micro management and 
resource allocation. Productivity and saving have increased dramatically.  A second key factor is 
the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Along with improvement in the investment 
climate in 1992-2001, FDI exceeded indirect financing, and the number of solely foreign-owned 
firms increased rapidly. There was a remarkable growth among foreign investors from Europe 
and North America in the manufacturing sector.   
 
Table 1 shows clearly that China has been augmenting its endowments intensively, both physical 
and human capital.  The accumulation of physical capital has been more rapid than the economic 
growth rates in both reform periods I and II. Total factor productivity grew more rapidly in 
reform period I, reflecting rapid institutional change and reallocation of resources to more 
productive sectors. More recently, physical capital stock grew dramatically in reform period II 
(2000-2005), although human capital accumulation slowed in the post-reform period.  However, 
unskilled labor is still more abundant, as reflected in the low relative wages for unskilled 
workers. However, growth accounting analysis also shows that in the recent years, China has 
been overly reliant on physical capital accumulation, while productivity gains (TFP growth) 
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Table 1.  Sources of China’s Growth: Augmenting Physical and Human Capital in 
Addition to Productivity Growth, 1953-2005 
 
Item  Pre-reform  Reform period I  Reform period II 
 (1953-77)  (1978-1999)  (2000–2005) 
UAverage annual growth rateU      
Output 6.12  9.56  9.17 
Physical capital stock  6.14  8.97  U12.47U 
Labor 2.24  2.13  1.00 
Human capital stock  5.46  2.14  1.28 
Total factor productivity  -0.80  2.94  1.79 
UContribution to GDP growth ( percent)U   
 
Physical capital stock  50.2  56.9  U68.0U 
Labor 18.3  11.1  5.5 
Human capital stock  U44.6U  U11.2U  U7.0U 
Total factor productivity  -13.1  U30.7U  U19.5U 




Labor Reallocation and Human Capital Augmentation: Learning Must Be in Sectors Where 
Prices Have Been Liberalized and Comparative Advantage Exists 
 
China has invested in the health and education of its population since the founding of the 
Republic.  At the end of the 1970s, the human development indicators of the Chinese population 
were higher than those of developing countries at the same income level.  However, investment 
in human capital has not exceeded the pace of physical capital accumulation.  
 
The most remarkable feature is the private sector-led learning and catch-up.  Since prices in 
labor intensive sectors were liberalized early in the reform process, learning first happened in 
those sectors where the cost advantage (or rate of return of learning) is high.  In those sectors in 
the early 1980s, TVEs and small private firms started to learn from the SOEs to meet domestic 
demand much before they were able to export.  This could be considered the stage of “learning 
for import substitution.”  Examples include the better designed clothing produced in Shenzhen, 
goods for sale in the domestic market, and the upgrading of bicycle companies into motorcycle 
companies. When domestic prices of these manufactured goods are higher than international 
prices, there is a huge incentive for private sector firms to learn to produce to meet domestic 
demand.  
 
Several remarkable features are particularly noteworthy.     20
•  First, private sector development was most rapid in the labor-intensive sectors where 
prices were liberalized early on, and entry and exit were allowed. New private firms 
mushroomed in the early stage of reforms, and they were able to learn initially from 
SOEs and to attract their technological know-how. The SOEs could not compete with the 
private firms in those sectors, and became nonviable.F
10
F  Between 1981 and 1991, TVEs’ 
annual growth rate in total output value was three times that of the state firms in the same 
period. By 1993-95, thanks to the famous “Zhucheng model,” local governments sold 
most of the small-to-medium size loss-making SOEs or privatized them without causing 
large displacement of workers.  
•  Second, there was a massive reallocation of labor, along with human capital, from public 
to private and export sectors, from capital-intensive to labor-intensive sectors where the 
rate of return to learning is higher.  Cadres and fresh graduates “plunged into the sea” to 
seek higher salaries in those sectors where prices and wages are liberalized – which are 
labor intensive sectors. In particular, there was a massive reallocation of labor from the 
primary sector to the secondary and tertiary sectors, which are more labor intensive (see 
Figure 6).  Today there is still a huge potential for China to develop its service sector, 
which is labor-intensive and underdeveloped; the tertiary sector accounted for only 40 
percent of GDP in 2007. 
 
Figure 6.  The Composition of Employment in China, 1978, 1995, 2007 
 




                                                 
10 Liberalizing entry and exit is crucial to learning based on comparative advantages, similar to Schumpeter’s idea 
of creative destruction (1942) which stresses new products and new services; and the endogenous growth model 
where monopolistic rents provide the payoff for research, and better products /services render previous one obsolete 
(Aghion and Howitt 1992). New entrants with better products /services drive the old firms out, which is good for 














•  Third, in the manufacturing sector, there is labor reallocation from capital to labor-
intensive subsectors.  Figure 7 shows that even when the entire manufacturing industry 
has shed labor in the recent years (1998-2006), the labor-intensive subsectors – such as 
apparel, footwear, leather, sporting goods, and furniture – are still expanding rapidly, and 
gaining larger shares in total manufacturing employment. The share of employment in 
the labor-intensive sector rose from 52 to 57 percent in total manufacturing.  In this 
period, employment in the manufacturing sector decreased by 1.55 percent, whereas, for 
apparel, footwear, leather, sporting goods, and furniture, it grew more than 6.5 percent 
annually. Employment in communications and computer assembly grew remarkably, at 












•   In addition to labor reallocation, China has been investing in formal education as well as 
on-the-job learning.  Each year, China sends many official delegations for study-tours, 
although data is sketchy.   For example, in order to learn the technology related to the 
high-speed trains from Siemens, 97 delegations or groups with 580 technicians were sent 
to Germany between 2006 and 2007, a contract on technological cooperation was signed.  
On April 11, 2008, China produced its first CHR3 high-speed rail motor-cars, now used 
between Beijing and Tianjin with a top speed of 350km per hour.F
11
F   
 
•  Since 1979, when Deng Xiaoping visited US President Jimmy Carter and agreed to 
expand the student exchange programs, more than 1.2 million students have studied in 
                                                 
11  People’s Daily (Overseas edition), page 8, November 24, 2008.  











more than 100 countries.  According to UNESCO, China has the largest number of 
students studying abroad, accounting for 1 out of 7 foreign students in the world.  In 
2007 alone, 144,000 went abroad, of which 129,000 are studying at their own expense.F
12
F  
There are also many who joined the “work-study” training programs in Japan.   
According to the Ministry of Commerce, more than 450,000 work-study students (UYan-
xiu sheng)U went to Japan, received apprenticeship / vocational training, and came back to 
China. These trained workers and returned scholars have played an important role in 




Rapid Physical Capital Augmentation: Market-Driven or Government-Driven? 
 
One special example is the significant investment in infrastructure. The Chinese government’s 
proactive fiscal policy and public investment have played an important role in infrastructure 
improvement. During the past 20 years, investment in public infrastructure increased rapidly. 
For example, in transportation, investment in fixed assets increased from RMB 33.37 billion in 
1990 to RMB 1122.45 billion in 2006.  Since 1998, total expenditure on transport infrastructure 
has exceeded 5 percent of GDP annually (World Bank 2007a).  
 
After 30 years of intensive capital augmentation, China now has  
 
•  The second longest expressways in the world  
•  Six out of ten of the largest ports in the world (Table A2). 
  
Better infrastructure has significantly reduced the transportation cost for manufacturing exports, 
creating a new comparative advantage that other developing nations do not have. This rapid 
development of infrastructure is partially market-driven and partially government driven, since 
there is market pressure to lower transportation costs for various localities to be able to export to 
the international market.  Thus, the local governments have an incentive to meet this market 
demand and build infrastructure for reducing the cost of trade.  China’s fiscal decentralization 
has provided great incentives for provincial and local governments to augment physical 
infrastructure.   
 
Augmentation by Foreign Direct Investment and Technology 
 
Figure 8 shows that foreign direct investment has been concentrated in the area of manufacturing, 
while the primary and tertiary sectors have been largely ignored. This pattern of FDI inflow is 
consistent with China’s comparative advantage, since foreign investment attempts to utilize 
China’s low-cost labor in order to compete in the international market.  China does not have 
comparative advantage in land-intensive agriculture or most other resource-intensive sectors; 
thus, the primary sector is not attractive for FDI. And the service sector was protected until 
recently.  
 
                                                 
12  People’s Daily (Overseas edition) page 6, November 28, 2008.   23
Openness and competition are crucial for learning and knowledge transfer, as there are at least 
three channels of knowledge transfer: a) technology could be embodied in imported equipment; 
b) entry of more efficient (foreign) firms could lead to exit of less efficient firms; and c) foreign 
investors bring not only capital, but also better products/services and practical sector-specific 
skills. They have the incentives to train workers and managers through apprenticeships and on-
the-job training. Following the same logic of learning as described above, when prices are 
liberalized and entry and exit are allowed, learning gains from foreign investors for the export 
market are high, and there is a strong incentive for the private sector to learn from foreign 
investors via joint ventures and learning-for-exporting.  
 
 
Figure 8. Sector Composition of FDI Stock in China: Concentration in the Manufacturing 
Sector  
 
Source: based on data from China Statistical Yearbook 2001-2008.  
 
 
As mentioned earlier, from 1992 to 2001, FDI inflows to China exceeded indirect flows, and the 
number of solely owned foreign firms rose rapidly. Multinational manufacturing firms from the 
OECD countries moved into China on a large scale, bringing advanced technology. After China 
joined the WTO in 2001, this trend continued.  Governments at all levels attach more importance 
to attracting high-tech firms, managerial know-how, and talent.  China has become an integral 
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4.3 Caveats:  Overinvesting in Physical Capital and Under-Investing in Human and Natural 
Capital? 
 
However, China’s investment is generally considered to be at a higher level than is desirable or 
sustainable, and many domestic and international observers argue that in order for growth to be 
sustainable, it needs to be rebalanced away from an excessive reliance on investment and exports, 
and toward consumption (Aziz and Dunaway 2007).   
 
Currently, a key concern is that the low cost of capital (the real rate of interest is less than half 
the level of the real GDP growth rate), together with the low cost of other inputs, such as energy 
and land prices, and externalities such as pollution, have contributed to excessive levels of 
investment. High levels of investment raise the risk of excess capacity in some sectors, 
contributing to price declines that in turn could be lead to increases in nonperforming loans and 
associated economic and financial disruptions.  Moreover, the low cost of capital has shifted 
production toward capital intensive methods that entail relatively little job creation, as is evident 
in the negative job growth in the manufacturing sector.  
 
Figure 9 shows that China is one of the most industry-led economies in the world, second only 
to Malaysia in terms of share of industry in value added, and its capital intensity is rising, as 
measured by investment over GDP.  The service sector accounts for about 40 percent of GDP, 
and is stagnating.  This pattern of development creates few jobs, and is inequitable and 
unsustainable, as shown below.  
 





Source: He and Kuijs 2007. 
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4.4 China’s Economic Growth is Too Capital Intensive and Imbalanced  
 
The gross investment share of the economy increased from about 35 percent at the beginning of 
the decade to a record high of 45 percent of GDP in 2006. Compared with Japan and Korea, 
China has an unusually high share of investment.F
13
F In contrast to the investment share, the 
private consumption share of GDP declined to less than 40 after the WTO accession. 
 
A World Bank study found that China’s growth pattern is increasingly capital intensive, with 
increasingly high levels of saving and investment (He and Kuijs, 2007). China’s gross fixed 
capital formation—in factories, buildings, and infrastructure—has always been relatively high. It 
increased further from 35 percent of GDP in 2000 to an estimated 45 percent of GDP in 2006. 
This was combined with a rise in (gross domestic) saving from 37 percent of GDP in 2000 to an 
estimated 51 percent in 2006. In contrast to conventional understanding, the bulk of China’s 
investment is financed domestically, much of it by enterprises. Conventional wisdom has long 
held that enterprise investment was largely financed by household savings, and many studies of 
China’s high saving still focus mainly on household savings. However, much of China’s high 
savings is done by enterprises, while the government also saves considerably. With household 
income around 60 percent of GDP, and with households now saving 25-30 percent of their 
income, down from more than 30 percent a decade ago, household saving has not been the 
driving force behind the impressive increase in China's domestic saving rate over the last decade. 
 
A recent IMF Working Paper found that the decline of household income is the main reason 
for the decline in the consumption share (Aziz and Cui, 2007). Despite the remarkably high 
national economic growth, the share of Chinese household incomes declined across all major 
sub-categories of wages, investment incomes, and government transfers.F
14
F I n  C h i n a ,  w a g e  
income consists of more than 86 percent of the total household disposable income. The share of 
wage income is estimated to have dropped from about 67 percent of GNP in the early 1980s to 
the current level of 56 percent (Figure A3 and A4). The share of investment income is very small 
and falling due to several reasons. First, ownership of Chinese firms is not widely held by 
households. Second, even listed firms did not distribute dividends, but instead reinvested most 
profits. Third, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) did not pay dividends to the government until 
recently. Lastly, bank deposits are the main savings vehicle of Chinese households. However, 
the interest rate on household deposits has been kept very low by the government.   
  
Job creation in China has been relatively slow in contrast to the soaring GDP growth in 
recent years. In addition to the problem of underemployment in the countryside, unemployment 
of the urban population is rapidly growing. China’s urban unemployment stems from two 
sources: one is the continuously enlarging urban labor supply due to the combination of the 
current increase in population and rural-to-urban migration; another is massive layoffs from the 
restructuring and downsizing of SOEs that are mostly located in urban areas. China’s official 
numbers on unemployment soared to 8.4 million in 2005. However, independent estimates, by 
                                                 
13 Lardy, 2006. 
14 Government transfer is part of government expenditure directed to support the poor and vulnerable households such as 
conditional cash transfers, unemployment benefit, medicare and social security.   26
Chinese economists using measures similar to those used in market economy countries, suggest 
that China’s urban unemployment rate has been 11 to 12 percent in recent years, almost three 
times more than the official rate.F
15
F Low employment leads to low disposable household income.  
 
Income inequality has been rising. While economic growth has brought unprecedented 
prosperity to China, income inequality has experienced a significant increase. China's Gini 
coefficient, a standard measure of a country's overall income inequality, increased from 0.30 in 
1981 to 0.43 in 2002, and rose to 0.45 in 2005 (Ravallion and Chen 2004, World Bank 2007). 
This figure represents an inequality level that is higher than that of the United States and Russia. 
A World Bank report showed that China's income inequality has grown wider in comparison 
with some other countries (Figure A5). The rapid increase in inequality is in part related to the 
distortions caused by the partially liberalized price system and the lack of competition in many 
sectors (Lin 2008). As discussed above, China has been following a low-interest rate policy for a 
long time, and over 80 percent of low-interest loans have been obtained by the state sector, 
which is more capital intensive. These low interest loans represent a capital subsidy to make 
capital cheaper for the state sector, providing incentives for developing capital-intensive 
products. Fewer jobs are being created in such a capital-intensive industrial structure, and 
income inequality is higher in part because subsidies are given to owners of capital, not to labor, 
and in part because of the dual structure farmers are not able to share equally in the benefits of 
pro-industry and pro-urban growth.  
 
 
4.5  A Myth about China’s Export Structure:  CAD or CAF? 
 
Six years after WTO accession, some economists argue that that China’s export bundle 
resembles that of a country with an income per-capita level three times higher than China’s 
(Rodrik 2006). Using another approach, Schott (2008) finds that the overlap between China’s 
exports to the US and those of OECD countries to the US increased from 15 percent in 1994 to 
21 percent in 2005.  These studies, however, neglect two important caveats. 
 
One caveat is that foreign invested enterprises (FIE) have played a very important role in 
China’s trade expansion and industrial upgrading. From 1985 to 2007, the share of FIE’s exports 
and imports increased from less than 10 percent to about 60 percent today (Figure A6). In the 
trade of certain advanced technology products (ATPs), the share of FIE is even higher. Recently, 
the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) conducted a study on China’s trade 
in advanced technology products. The results showed that while China ran a $41-$49 billion 
surplus with the US in 2006 based on the US Census ATP definition, a huge gap still exists 
between Chinese ATP exports to the US and US ATP exports to China. In addition, more than 
95 percent of China’s ATP exports were processing exports during 1995-2006, more than 90 
percent of China’s ATP exports to the US were produced by FIEs in China, and about 65 percent 
of China’s ATP exports to the US were from various policy zones in 2006 (Ferrantino et. al., 
2007). 
 
                                                 
15 Bergsten et. al, 2006.   27
Another caveat is the practice known as processing trade. A large and increasing share of 
China’s exports involve assembling duty-free imported inputs for export, a practice known as 
processing trade.  The share of processing trade in China’s exports has risen from 47 percent in 
1992 to 55 percent in 2007.F
16
F The share of processing trade varies across industries.  In the high 
export growth machinery sector, most of this growth is indeed due to growth in processing trade 
(Amiti and Freund, 2008).  Ferrantino et al. (2007) find that 90 percent of China’s expanding 
ATP exports to the US are in processing trade.    
 
The role of processing trade in the upgrading of skills is debatable. Amiti and Freund (2008) 
calculated the skill content of only those exports that exclude processing trade.  Interestingly, 
they found that, for China’s non-processing exports, there was no change in the skill content 
between 1992 and 2005.  Thus UallU the skill upgrading observed in total exports was due to 
the high skill content in the processing trade.  An implication of this finding is that China has 
a great distance to go before the skill content in its non-processing exports comes even close to 
that of processing trade.  
 
A recent study has methodologically calculated the total domestic value added in China’s 
exports (Koopman, Wang, and Wei, 2008). It shows that the shares of domestic and foreign 
value added in total exports are about 50:50, but domestic value added is much lower than 
foreign value added in processing trade (Figure A8).  
 
•  First, the authors estimate that the level of foreign content in Chinese exports is close to 
50 percent, almost twice as high as what another group of authors found.  
 
•  Second, they find interesting heterogeneity across sectors: those sectors that are likely to 
be labeled as sophisticated or high-skilled, such as computers, electronic devices, and 
telecommunication equipment, tend to have an especially low share of domestic content.  
 
•  Conversely, many sectors that are relatively intensive in low-skilled labor, such as 
apparel, are likely to exhibit a high share of domestic content (Koopman, Wang and Wei, 
2008b).  
 
•  Again, this study reveals that China has gone a long way in upgrading, but it has been 
only partially successful. China has yet to become competitive with industrial countries 
in high-tech sectors. In other words, China still has a long way to go in climbing the 
technological ladder.  This confirms that China’s export structure is still consistent 
with its comparative advantage, if one looks carefully beneath the surface, and 





                                                 
16 It is noteworthy that processing exports which are particularly sensitive to the global trade cycle, have been 
particularly badly affected by the current global downturn, whereas "normal" exports have been holding up better.  
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V. Lessons Learned from China’s Experience 
 
China has experienced dramatic expansion in its trade, and changes in its export composition. In 
manufacturing, it has moved from labor intensive goods, such as apparel, textiles, footwear, and 
toys, to more sophisticated manufactured machinery and equipment. What lessons can be 
learned from China’s experience?  Are these lessons relevant for Africa? 
 
1. Liberalizing imports alone is not sufficient to jump-start exports. China’s average tariffs were 
not significantly lowered until the mid-1990s, although effective tariffs were reduced for 
processing trade and SEZs. The Chinese strategy consists of two equally important parts: 
economic system reform and the gradual opening of its markets to the outside world. Neither one 
is dispensable for achieving stability and dynamic growth.  This is relevant in Africa, as imports 
are liberalized in many countries but exports have yet to expand. There are many issues related 
to the development stage the country is in and what comparative advantage the country has, 
which requires country-specific analysis. In general, a country cannot go beyond its development 
stage and export in sectors where there is no comparative advantage. In addition, regulatory 
reforms to reduce entry barriers and institutional reforms to provide incentives for the private 
sector to invest, learn, and produce for the domestic market must be implemented, before it is 
possible to export to neighboring countries. 
 
2. Import substitution vs export promotion? It depends on a country’s development stage and its 
comparative advantages. China has experimented with Special Economic Zones and opening to 
FDI, which allowed the transformation from a heavy-industry and primary goods exporter to 
labor-intensive manufacturing exporter, consistent with its comparative advantages. Price 
liberalization and entry and exit played an important role in this process. Many export 
processing zones (EPZs) have been established in Africa, which is the right step. However, the 
incentive structure must be in place for the private sector to produce where there is a cost 
advantage or comparative advantage.   
 
In many African countries, we see large price differentials between imported goods at home and 
those on the international markets. One example is motorcycles, which offer relatively low-cost 
transportation and greatly expand the market size for farmers and other producers. Whereas in 
other countries in Africa, motorcycle use has been minimal with cost prohibitively high, demand 
for motorcycles has grown in Nigeria in recent years. A roadside assembly operation could 
generate income of $9 per motorcycle sold for $400 to $700 depending on the model. This is 
where the learning gain could be large for the country’s growth and development.  A similar 
example where there is also a large price difference is water pumps. A country may have to go 
through a period of “import substitution” in order to meet domestic demand and promote private 
sector growth, before it can be successful in meeting international demand.   
 
Another example is the computer assembly cluster in Nigeria, with a firm in Lagos importing 
components, assembling them, and selling them in the domestic market.  Having begun with 
desktops, the firm is now assembling laptops too. Again, it is labor-intensive work with the 
potential for incremental technological upgrading over time.  The computer cluster is now able   29
to export computers to neighboring countries. (See also Zeng, 2008, on cluster-based growth in 
Africa.)  
 
3. What African countries should avoid is price distortions over the long run. One of the lessons 
from China’s partial and piece-meal reform is that some distortions were kept for too long, 
including low interest rates and controlled prices for energy, water, electricity, and land. As 
discussed earlier, a low interest rate has distorted the financial and industrial structure toward 
more capital-intensive industries. This could also lead to higher income inequality, as discussed 
above. Low and subsidized prices for energy have encouraged high energy consumption, low-
energy efficiency, and high emissions and pollution.  
 
China has paid a high social and environmental cost for its rapid growth, which arguably could 
have been avoided. This can be seen most clearly in excessive energy consumption and serious 
environmental degradation and pollution. A recent World Bank study found that the health cost 
of air and water pollution in China amounts to about 4.3 percent of its GDP. Adding the non-
health impacts of pollution, estimated at about 1.5 percent of GDP, brings the total cost of air 
and water pollution to about 5.8 percent of GDP (World Bank 2007b).  Fully aware of this issue, 
the Chinese government set up targets for saving energy and reducing pollutant emissions in its 
eleventh Five-Year Plan. This is of vital importance in efforts to change the pattern of economic 
growth and to increase energy conservation and environmental protection. However, China fell 
short of the targets set at the beginning last year for cutting energy consumption per unit of GDP 
by about 4 percent and total discharge of major pollutants by 2 percent. Energy efficiency 
declined from the 1980s to the 2000s but rebounded after 2003.  To make growth more 
sustainable, China needs reduce subsidies to energy, water, and land, and rebalance away from 
heavy and energy-intensive industries toward the service sectors. Fiscal policy can be used to 
spend more on providing public goods and social services, and encouraging the development of 




VI. Conclusion   
 
"Comparative advantage still explains much, perhaps most of world trade.  
However, both traditional location theory and recent work in economic geography 
generally Uassume away Uinherent differences between locations, and instead explain 
regional specialization in terms of some kind of external economies." 
 
Paul Krugman 1995 
 
One does not need to look far in order to understand China’s rapid trade integration with the 
world.  As acknowledged by Paul Krugman, trade between countries with different endowment 
structures due to different stages of development can be better explained by the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model. Krugman's own model assumes that the endowment structures are the same across 
countries (and regions).  In a sense, he assumes away the inherent difference in factor 
endowments. Therefore, in his model trade is determined by (regional) specialization. In fact,   30
most trade occurs between countries at a similar stage of development, which have a similar 
endowment structure. That is why Krugman’s contribution to trade theory won Nobel Prize. 
However, his theory is not intended to explain trade among countries with different endowment 
structures and at different stages of development.  
 
In addition to CAF, what more can China’s experience tell us? Market-based learning.F
17
F  
China has been a proactive and selective learner. The entire 30 years of reform can be rightly 
described as a process of learning, selective adaptation/acquisition, augmentation, and industrial 
upgrading. Experimentation, trial and error, incubation, and innovation have played important 
roles in its success.  
 
Three more takeaways:  
 
First, the learning process that we stress here should be used to help a country specialize in 
certain industries that are consistent with its comparative advantages so that it can trade not 
only with countries having different endowment structures, but also with countries having a 
similar endowment structure. The argument should not be used to support a country that 
attempts to go against its comparative advantages, determined by its endowment structure, to 
develop certain capital-intensive or technology-intensive industries to compete with high-income 
countries. This is because the specialization in a capital-intensive good that a capital-scarce low-
income country can reach, a capital-abundant high-income country can also reach easily. With a 
similar specialization, the capital-intensive good produced by a high-income country will be 
cheaper than that produced by a low-income country. 
 
Second, to achieve export competitiveness, it is crucial to liberalize prices, and reduce barriers to 
entry and exit in most sectors, so that private sector firms can select the right subsector and 
products where they have true comparative advantage.  Providing subsides to certain export 
industries would make them nonviable and vulnerable to shocks in the external environment.  
Learning would happen when and where the expected rate of return is high and uncertainty in 
the macro environment is low. Consistent with the theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter 
1942), firms armed with new products and services will drive out firms with obsolete products, 
and hence gain from learning and innovation. This is the true driver of industrial upgrading.  
 
Third, the pace of reforms, adaptation, and innovation should be commensurate with a country’s 
development stage and regulatory capacity.  China certainly did not do everything right during 
the trials and experimentations of the past 30 years of reforms. It paid dearly in high “tuition.” 
But, as a good student, China has been learning, selectively, from the experiences of other 
developed and developing countries – learning well and fast.  Through learning-by-doing, China 
is catching up at a pace that is consistent with its institutional capacity and national objectives. It 
is noteworthy that the pace of reforms has seldom been allowed to go beyond institutional and 
regulatory capacity. In other words, China has been engaging in experiments that are 
controllable – one example is China’s cautious attitude toward capital account liberalization and 
financial innovations including securitization (e.g. the initiate-and-distribute model in mortgage 
                                                 
17 As described in the simple model in Section 2, market-based learning happens when and where there is a cost 
advantage or comparative advantage. Market is a benchmark for selection.    31
backed securities). The government has been reluctant to go along with a policy reform that is 
too complex to be able to be fully understood and controlled by regulators.  With the benefit of 
hindsight, this cautious attitude toward certain complex reforms /financial instruments (such as 
Credit Default Swaps, CDS and Collateralized Debt Obligations, CDOs) is wise and prudent.  
 
Looking forward, China is now better positioned than it was before to meet complex 
development challenges by drawing on its own experience as well as the experience of others, 
and by continuing to combine openness (kaifang) with institutional reform and capacity building 
(gaige).  Recently there are signs of an accelerating pace of reform: in announcing the $586 
billion dollar stimulus package for growth, policymakers have shown a strong determination to 
reform fiscal policies to correct the remaining price distortions, including subsidies for water, 
fuel, and other natural resources. It is thus transforming fiscal policies from aiming for 
industrialization to focusing on public service provision, in order to build a people-centered and 
harmonious society. Many new reform measures have been announced to make the growth 
pattern more equitable and more sustainable.  It is for this reason that researchers are confident 
that over time, the strong commitment to continuous openness and institutional reforms will 
allow China to make greater inroads in its own national objectives as well as to influence others 
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Table A1.  Initial Conditions: Share of Manufactures in Total Merchandise Export, 



























Table A2:  Ranking of the World’s Largest Ports 
 
 







equipment  Country of  
origin  1960 1981  1960 1981 
United States  63  70    35  44 
Germany, Fed. Rep  87  86    44  45 
France 73  73    25  34 
Japan 79  97    23  57 
          
Yugoslavia 37  79    15  29 
Uruguay 29  30    (.)  2 
Hungary 66  65    38  31 
Brazil 3  41    (.)  18 
Chile 4  10    0  2 
South Korea  14  90    (.)  22 
          
Thailand 2  27    0  5 
Sri Lanka  (.)  21    0  (.) 
China ..  53    ..  5 
India 45  59    1  8 
Burma 1  ..    0  .. 
Source: World Bank (1985) China's Long Term Issues and Options 
RANK PORT COUNTRY MEASURE TONS
1 Shanghai China MT 537.0
2 Singapore Singapore FT 448.5
3 Rotterdam Netherlands MT 378.4
4 Ningbo China MT 309.7
5 Guangzhou China MT 302.8
6 Tianjin China MT 257.6
7 Hong Kong China MT 238.2
8 Qingdao China MT 224.2
9 Busan South Korea RT 217.9
10 Nagoya Japan MT 208.0
Abbreviations: MT=Metric Ton  FT=Freight Ton.  RT = Revenue Ton.
TOTAL CARGO  VOLUME, MILLIONS OF TONS
Sources:   Shipping Statistics Yearbook 2007; Containerisation International 
Yearbook 2008;U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Waterborne Commerce of the 
United States CY 2006;  AAPA Surveys; various port authority internet sites.  37
Table A3. Average Annual Change in Manufacturing Employment, and its Labor-
Intensive Subsectors (1998-2006) 
Average Annual Change in Manufacturing (and subsectors) Employment (1998-2006)
Sector Average Annual Change
Manufacturing -1.55%






Leather, Fur, Feather Products 6.60%
Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, and Straw Products -1.53%
Furniture 8.14%
Paper and Paper Products -3.62%
Printing and Recording Media -5.08%





Non-metallic Mineral Products -3.34%
Communication Equipment, Computer and Other Electronic Equipment 11.60%
Equipment for Leisure & Office Use 2.13%
Others, (incl Handicraft, Recycling and Disposal of Waste, etc.) -3.32%
Source: China Labor Statistical Yearbook 1999-2007.  
 
 
Figure A1. China’s Merchandise Trade from 1978 to 2007 
(Billion USD) 
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Source: China’s Ministry of Commerce. 
 
 
Figure A3. China’s consumption declined consistently (1996-2006) 
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Figure A4. China’s Wage Income Share of GNP (Percent) 
 
 





Figure A5. A cross-country perspective on inequality in China 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
 
 
Figure A7. The Share of Processing Trade in China (2002-2007) 
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Source: Ministry of Commerce, China. 
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Figure A8. Shares of Domestic and Foreign Value Added:  
Total Export vs. Processing Export 
 



















Source: Koopman, Wang and Wei. 2008b. 